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A B S T R A C T
This paper examines the implications of political factors for social policy choices. Speciﬁcally, we
explore the link between regime type and adoption of unconditional transfers versus transfers
conditioned on beneﬁciaries’ investments in human capital. Due to the direct nature of beneﬁts,
unconditional transfers are more likely to be used to buy oﬀ opposition and prevent social
unrest. As transfers that are conditioned on education and health pay oﬀ only in a relatively
distant future, they are rarely initiated for political motives and rather deﬁned by interests of
long-term development and human capital accumulation. Using the new dataset on Non-
Contributory Social Transfer Programs (NSTP) in developing countries, we ﬁnd that transfers
are indeed chosen so as to be unconditional under less democratic regimes. There is some
evidence that conditional transfers are more likely to be adopted in democracies. In particular,
democracies tend to increase the number of conditional schemes once any social transfer
program is introduced.
1. Introduction
Social protection programs are fundamental for poverty alleviation as they help to raise the living standards of the poor. Since the
beginning of the 1990s, antipoverty transfer programs have been broadly extended in developing countries. However, policymakers
may adopt social policies not only to combat poverty and inequality but also to please voters in case of upcoming elections, to
increase oﬃce value, or to pursue rent-seeking. These political motives compromise the eﬀectiveness of social policies. In addition,
political institutions themselves, such as regime type or electoral rule, create biases for the optimal design of social transfer
programs. Speciﬁc elements of the design of pro-poor programs might be manipulated for a variety of political ends. Further, in
developing countries—where high inequality and poverty problems are far from uncommon—political leaders have to base their
agendas on redistribution and antipoverty policies. Therefore, a key challenge is to understand what role political constraints play in
the adoption of pro-poor programs in developing countries. This paper focuses on one characteristic of the design of social transfer
programs that might be chosen strategically, namely the conditionality of transfers. In the literature, there is no theoretical
foundation or conclusive empirical evidence on the politics of assigning conditions. Therefore, in this paper we examine whether the
introduction of conditions is solely based on pro-poor considerations or whether political motives also aﬀect such policy decisions.
Speciﬁcally, we explore whether the regime type matters for the design of a transfer program.
Unconditional transfers include all cash and in-kind transfers that do not require the beneﬁciary to comply with any conditions
apart from meeting the eligibility criteria. This group of transfers is aimed at current consumption increase and short-term, income-
smoothing eﬀects. Old-age grants, family support schemes, and other social pensions are good examples of such transfers that are
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paid to every (poor) household or to informal workers. In the case of conditional transfers, the poor are required to comply with
certain behavioral rules in order to receive the beneﬁts, for example regular health check-ups and/or school attendance by their
children. Hence, conditional transfers are costlier in implementation in the short run but lead to higher returns in the long run if the
poor would underinvest in health and education otherwise. A particular feature of such schemes is that they incentivize human
capital accumulation and thereby promote the long-term prospects of poverty reduction being sustainable and successful.
Several strategic motives to assign conditions that are not related to pro-poor concerns can be distinguished. On the one hand,
conditional transfers help to facilitate targeting and to increase public support for redistribution by beneﬁting only the “deserving
poor”—in other words, those who comply with the conditions. Hence, they may be used strategically to target certain population
groups or they may be preferred in societies with a higher degree of paternalism. In contrast, unconditional transfers may be favored
as they allow leaders to contribute to the welfare of the masses in the short run and can thus be used to reward political supporters or
reduce public unrest.
The dominating motives to adopt conditions might diﬀer systematically between political regimes. In non-democratic countries,
the primary strategic reason to redistribute is to prevent uprisings and maintain the ruling elite's power. Non-democracies may
therefore prefer unconditional transfers. Democratic countries rely on public support which is likely to increase redistribution in
general and public spending on education and health in particular. In addition, democracies are considered as higher accountable to
the public and care more about the long term prospects of poverty reduction. Consequently, they may be more likely to adopt
conditional transfers that also give beneﬁts in a relatively distant future. We diﬀerentiate democracies and non-democracies using
the polity score from Marshall et al. (2016) and the binary measure of democracy from Boix et al. (2013). Whereas the former rather
focuses on constitutional constraints, the latter reﬂects the implementation of democracy in practice.
While the political economy of redistribution in developed countries has already been broadly explored in the literature, few
studies have focused on developing countries. Moreover, existing studies consider proxies for redistribution such as tax revenue,
government expenditure, or health and education spending, which are inadequate in developing countries. We propose to proxy
redistribution with modern social transfer programs as they are the main redistributive policy in developing countries.
The new database by Dodlova et al. (2017) on non-contributory social transfer programs in developing countries, makes it
possible to test the existence of systematic diﬀerences in the use of conditions between regime types. We compare 163 unconditional
and conditional non-contributory transfer schemes in 99 countries in a panel form from 1960 until 2015. Controlling for economic
development, demographic structure, inequality and other characteristics we explore how the regime type inﬂuences the type of
social transfers. The empirical strategy includes using not only standard speciﬁcations with country- and time-ﬁxed eﬀects but also
models with instrumental variables. We adopt two approaches to deal with the endogeneity of the democracy variable: democratic
capital in neighboring countries and regional democratization waves.
This paper, ﬁrst, ﬁnds ambiguous evidence on the relationship between the regime type and the probability of having a transfer
program of any type. This can be partly explained by our second – very robust – ﬁnding. We show that non-democratic countries are
more likely to adopt unconditional transfers. Third, there is some evidence that democracies tend to promote more conditional
transfer programs. Yet, this ﬁnding is robust when we look at the share of conditional programs in all transfer programs in a sub-
sample of countries that have adopted at least one social transfer program.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the related literature. Section 3 presents the empirical strategy and
Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 discusses the empirical results as well as robustness checks. The ﬁnal section concludes.
2. Related literature
This paper relates to several strands of literature. First, the analysis of determinants of a type of transfer is related to the debate
on regime type and redistribution in general. For democratic countries, the seminal model by Meltzer and Richard (1981) assumes
that because the income distribution is always right-skewed the median voter has a below-mean income, and so favors
redistribution. Further, higher inequality leads to greater redistribution—as the median voter shifts more to the left of the income
distribution (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994). However, recent studies cannot conﬁrm the implications of median voter theory and
propose explanations for lower rates of redistribution in democratic and/or unequal societies (Albertus and Menaldo, 2013;
Acemoglu et al., 2011, 2014b; Przeworski, 2016). In particular, Przeworski (2016) argues that the median voter theorem does not
allow for political power to vary between individuals belonging to diﬀerent income groups. Acemoglu et al. (2011) state that a
democratic but ineﬃcient structure of government based on patronage leads to a rich–bureaucratic coalition and promotes high
rents and less redistribution. Keeping ﬁscal capacity at low levels is a way to constrain future redistribution. Acemoglu et al. (2014b)
ﬁnd a robust and quantitatively signiﬁcant eﬀect of democracy on tax revenues and secondary school investments that supports the
conclusion of higher redistribution and human capital investments in democracies. However, they ﬁnd no eﬀect of democracy on
inequality.
In non-democratic regimes, the leader alone or the ruling elite decides on social policy. Redistribution might be used to appease
the poor and prevent a revolution that could result in democratization (Mejia and Posada, 2007). Further, by targeting speciﬁc
groups redistribution may help to increase the number of supporters and thus contribute to the political survival of autocrats
(Knutsen and Rasmussen, 2014). Or, on the contrary, redistribution may be used by the leader to reduce the wealth of some groups
so as to limit their future political power (Leon, 2014; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). A similar argument is made by Solt (2008),
who asserts that in autocracies political leaders may redistribute less because higher inequality depresses political participation.
Hence, redistribution can play a strategic role too.
The main contribution of this paper is on the politics of social transfers. We provide new evidence on how the regime type may
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aﬀect the choice made in favor of or against conditions. While the aim of conditions is to increase household investment in education
and health, critics argue that they are costly and unnecessary. Regarding the diﬀerences between types of transfer, the eﬃciency and
eﬀectiveness of unconditional versus conditional transfers have indeed already been broadly discussed in the literature. Both types of
schemes are found to contribute to poverty reduction (Barrientos, 2013; Browne, 2015). Scholars conﬁrm that conditional cash
transfers (CCTs) with explicit education conditions and penalties for non-compliance have a stronger eﬀect on school achievements
than unconditional transfers do (Baird et al., 2013; De Brauw and Hoddinott, 2011). Interestingly, Benhassine et al. (2015) ﬁnd
improvements in educational service for transfers with non-enforceable conditions—in other words, that merely label beneﬁts for
educational use. Studies that focus on CCTs also provide evidence of increased health service use and improved health outcomes
(Fiszbein and Schady, 2009; Ranganathan and Lagarde, 2012). Recent studies that compare conditional and unconditional transfers
suggest that health conditions do indeed matter (Attanasio et al., 2015; Robertson et al., 2015).
Regarding the political motives that aﬀect the choice of social transfer programs, conditional transfers might be preferred in
societies where the poor are only perceived as deserving of assistance if they make an eﬀort—in other words, if they comply with
conditions (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009). A related argument is that conditions facilitate the targeting of poor children who cannot be
held responsible for their economic situation. Moreover, by the examples of diﬀerent conditional cash transfer programs it has been
shown that social beneﬁts can be strategically used to gain or to reward political supporters (e.g. Manacorda et al., 2011; De La O,
2013; Labonne, 2013). Some other political factors which shape social security systems are reviewed in Galasso and Profeta (2002).
However, to the best of our knowledge there are no comparative studies that focus on the political motives behind introducing
conditions. Systematic diﬀerences in assigning conditions between democracies and non-democracies would indicate that it is not
only eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness considerations that determine the choice of transfer programs.
Our paper is also related to the literature on the incentives of leaders in diﬀerent political regimes to invest in human capital
development. Klomp and de Haan (2013) show that democracies typically invest more in human capital, while unstable and non-
democratic regimes limit such investments. The authors apply a combined approach, and use a large set of indicators on human
capital. Many more studies proxy human capital investments through government expenditure on education and health. A number
of studies conﬁrm that government expenditure on education and health, as well as indicators of human capital, such as life
expectancy and education levels, are higher in democracies compared to non-democracies (Acemoglu et al., 2014a; Baum and Lake,
2003; Brown and Hunter, 2004; Stasavage, 2005). In addition, Miller (2015) examines more deeply the diﬀerences across autocratic
types and ﬁnds that regimes with multiparty autocratic elections promote human development more than other autocratic regimes
do. Higher human capital investments in more democratic countries may be explained by the fact that democracies rely on a broad
voter base that beneﬁts from public education and health systems and hence holds political leaders accountable for the services.
Non-democracies are generally supported by the rich who often prefer private education and health providers. Another argument is
that non-democratic regimes may be threatened by an educated population (Feng, 2003). Finally, the regime type may aﬀect public
health and education spending through its impact on income and governance (Rajkumar and Swaroop, 2008). Democracies are
generally richer and better governed and this in turn aﬀects the eﬃciency of public services. As we suggest to use an alternative proxy
for human capital investments – assigning conditions in social transfer schemes – our ﬁndings also complement this literature.
Finally, using data on social transfer programs to capture progressive redistribution enables us to shed light on controversial
empirical ﬁndings on the triple relationship between regime type, redistribution, and inequality (Dodlova and Giolbas 2017).
Previous ambiguous empirical ﬁndings may be partially explained by the lack of reliable data in developing countries, which causes
limitations in related methodological approaches. Typically, tax revenues and government expenditures are used as proxies for
redistribution. For example, Mulligan et al. (2004) and Ansell and Samuels (2014) ﬁnd no correlation between tax revenues and
democracy in a cross-section sample. Mulligan et al. (2010) even conﬁrm the opposite—that democracies spend a little less of their
GDP on social security. Profeta et al. (2013) ﬁnd no evidence for a link between separate tax revenues and political variables like civil
liberties and democratic institutions, when controlling for country-ﬁxed eﬀects. Nevertheless, there are many studies that do ﬁnd a
certain positive relationship between democracy and redistribution. In particular, Aidt and Jensen (2008) show a positive eﬀect of
suﬀrage on government expenditures as a share of GDP and tax revenues as a share of GDP. Other studies ﬁnd evidence that
democracy has positive eﬀects on government expenditures as well as on social security spending as a share of GDP (e.g. Acemoglu
et al., 2014b; Lindert, 2004). Being a democracy also aﬀects taxation structure and patterns (Hettich and Winer, 1999; Kenny and
Winer, 2006). However, in developing countries the data on taxes and social spending is highly imperfect because of high tax evasion
rates, non-transparency, and weak state capacity. The strength of the NSTP dataset by Dodlova et al. (2017) is that it captures
progressive redistribution to the poor. This dataset signiﬁcantly expands and updates the work by Barrientos et al. (2010) in terms of
both the time period covered and the number of programs included.
The literature review thus leads us to the following assertions that we test empirically below. (1) Democracies engage more in
redistribution and are therefore more likely to adopt a social transfer program. (2) We expect that non-democracies have a higher
probability to adopt unconditional transfer programs as the literature ascribes the retention of power as the main motive to
redistribute in such countries. Unconditional transfers require less bureaucratic eﬀort and state capacity and provide immediate
poverty relief. They are therefore assumed to be a more operative tool for politically motivated redistribution than conditional
transfers. (3) We expect a higher probability to adopt conditional programs in democratic countries since politicians in democracies
are disciplined through reelection and therefore, they seek public support by increasing spending on social welfare policies and on
education and health. Moreover, democracies are considered as higher accountable, especially if they are characterized by free and
fair elections, and so they care more about long run development. As conditional programs imply investments in education and
health they have been shown to be more eﬀective at enhancing human capital and thus self-sustained development than
unconditional programs.
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3. Econometric speciﬁcation
In this section, we present our empirical strategy to investigate the relationship between regimes and types of transfer. First, we
estimate a canonical panel data model with country-ﬁxed eﬀects and year dummies. Second, we carry out an instrumental variable
estimation to deal with time-varying omitted variables that may simultaneously aﬀect the likelihood of regime change and adoption
of social transfer programs.
The ﬁrst econometric speciﬁcation, ﬁxed-eﬀects model, is the following:
T β β D Σγ X ν δ ε= + + + + +it it k it
k
i t it0 1 −1 −1 (1)
where Tit is the outcome of interest, which is either a dummy that indicates if a country has (1) any transfer or (2) a certain type of
transfer (conditional or unconditional transfer program) or (3) a share of the respective type of transfer in the total number of
transfer programs in a country in a particular year. In the ﬁrst case, countries without any transfer program are included in the
sample, while in the second case the analysis is restricted to countries with at least one transfer program in operation. As some
countries focus their resources on large ﬂagship programs while others have several schemes, often conditional as well as
unconditional ones, the share of a type of transfer captures its relative importance.
The main independent variable Dit−1 is the level of democracy measured by either the polity score from Marshall et al. (2016) or
the binary democracy score from Boix et al. (2013). The vector of all other control variables is Xkit−1 and includes economic
development indicators, population structure measures, and other characteristics of countries. We use the logarithm of all control
variables to facilitate the interpretation and allow the impact of democracy to be proportional to the baseline level. In addition, we
control for the overall number of social transfer programs within the region to capture social policy diﬀusion (Gilardi, 2010). All
independent variables are lagged to take into account that current social policy is determined by earlier levels of the political,
economic, and demographic indicators. The error term that captures all omitted variables and random errors is εit, the country-ﬁxed
eﬀects refer to νi, and time eﬀects are denoted by δt. The latter eﬀects capture common shocks and time trends for all countries. We
thus control for two sources of potential bias. First, we allow democracies to be diﬀerent from non-democracies in many permanent
non-observed characteristics that also aﬀect the adoption of social transfer programs. Second, we take into account the time trend of
the broad expansion of social transfer programs, especially in recent years.
The eﬀect of democracy in the OLS estimations is likely to be biased if there are time-varying omitted variables that
simultaneously aﬀect the likelihood of transitioning to democracy and the adoption of social transfer programs. For example, state
capacity, higher citizens’ demand for redistribution or human capital endowments might inﬂuence both democratization and the
adoption of a transfer program in a country. The direction of the bias in the OLS estimates, however, is not clear as there might be
several omitted variables whose eﬀects might oﬀset each other. Omitted variables are only one of the causes of endogeneity.
Measurement error in the democracy variable may also increase the bias of the OLS estimates. Finally, the inverse relationship
between a type of transfer and democracy may double the problem. A speciﬁc type of transfer being adopted can change the
preferences and income of the poor and aﬀect their demand for democratization.
We follow two IV strategies to deal with the endogeneity problem. First, following Persson and Tabellini (2009), we instrument
democracy with the average of a country's neighbors’ democratic scores. The idea is to control for endogenous transitions through
democratic capital accumulated in the country's neighborhood. The corresponding two-stage least squares (2SLS) model we estimate
is given by:
T β β D Σγ X ν δ ε
D β πZ Σγ X μ λ u
= + + + + +
= + + + + +
it it k it
k
i t it
it it k it
k
i t it
0 1 −1 −1
−1 0 −1 −1 (2)
where Z D= ∑it N j i
N
jt−1
1
≠ −1 is an average of democratic scores in neighboring countries.
1 Our key assumption of exclusion restriction,
E ε Z v δ( | , , )it it i t−1 = 0, is that democratic regimes in neighbor countries do not have a direct impact on the adoption of a transfer
program in a particular country.
The second strategy is based on regional waves of democratization as a source of exogenous variation. We rely on Acemoglu et al.
(2014b) and Huntington (1991), who argue that democratization occurs in regional waves that are not only explained by economic
trends. Their approach diﬀers from Persson and Tabellini (2009), as it exploits regional waves rather than an individual country's
democratic score regressed on its neighbors’ democratic ones. They support the reasonable hypothesis that the demand for
democracy spreads within a region where countries typically have a similar history, close culture, and informational ties (Acemoglu
et al., 2014b). We have the same 2SLS speciﬁcation as in (2), but now the instrument is deﬁned by the jack-knifed average of
democratic scores in the region including only countries that had a similar democratic score as the considered country in the initial
period2:
∑Z N D′ =
1
−1it r j i
N
jt−1
≠
−1
r
(3)
1 Persson and Tabellini (2009) take the average of polity scores weighted by the inverse distance between capitals of neighboring countries. However, we believe
that the democratic capital spreads out across-the-board and the simple average of polity scores also proves to be a valid instrument.
2 In our case, the initial period was 1960.
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We assume that the exclusion restriction is true E ε Z v δ( | ′ , , )it it i t−1 = 0. Hence, our identiﬁcation also relies on the assumption that
democratic waves have no direct eﬀect on the adoption of a social transfer program in a particular country.
One threat to the validity of our instrument is that democratic capital and democratization waves inﬂuence the probability of
having a transfer program in neighboring countries or in the region and that this aﬀects the probability to adopt a transfer program
in a given country. We exclude this channel by allowing for social policy diﬀusion. In all speciﬁcations, we include the variable that
indicates the number of transfer programs in the region in the previous year.
4. Data
The new NSTP dataset constructed by Dodlova et al. (2017) allows to distinguish between diﬀerent types of transfer programs.
This database provides detailed information on non-contributory social transfer schemes in developing countries, including types of
transfer, targeting mechanisms, duration, mode of delivery, and—where available—budget and coverage of programs. The dataset
covers the most prominent and important programs, and hence reﬂects the main characteristics and trends of social policies in
diﬀerent countries.
Dodlova et al. (2017) distinguish between unconditional family support schemes, social pension schemes, conditional cash
transfers (CCTs), and public works programs. They deﬁne unconditional family support schemes as transfers targeted to low-income
households, or speciﬁcally to children, that are not tied to investments in asset accumulation or human capital. They range from a
basic safety net for those below the poverty line to (universal) child support grants. Under social pension schemes the authors
subsume transfers to the elderly that are independent of a history of contributions by the beneﬁciary or his/her employer. We
combine family support and social pension schemes into our category of unconditional transfers and contrast them with CCTs, which
link the receipt of a transfer to investments in human capital. We also distinguish between conditions attached to improving
education outcomes, health status, or both and check our results with diﬀerent types of conditions. Typically, health conditions help
to improve child and/or maternal health service usage. Education conditions are designed to increase school enrollment and
achievements of children from low-income households.
The most well-known example of a conditional program is Mexico's Prospera (earlier Opportunidades), which provides income
transfers to poor households if their children are regularly enrolled at school and they regularly report their children's health status.
The strictness of conditions ranges from clearly deﬁned behaviors that are veriﬁed, and whose noncompliance is sanctioned, to softer
conditions that are not enforced. A good example is the conditional scheme introduced in the early 1990s in Honduras, the Programa
de Asignacion Familiar (PRAF), or Family Allowances Program. The program was designed to distribute cash subsidies, ﬁrst, to
families with children aged from 6 to 12 who were enrolled in primary school and regularly attended classes and, second, to families
with children under 3 and pregnant mothers who regularly visited health centers. In this particular case, school enrollment but not
attendance was enforced as a condition of the payments, while no transfers were suspended because of no visits to health centers.
The sample includes 163 social transfers in 99 developing countries, covering the period up to 2015. In 2015 there are 70
unconditional family support programs, 64 CCTs, and 43 social pensions. Of all the CCTs, 23 require education and 8 health
investments; 33 are conditional upon investments in both education and health.
We conduct our main analysis on a country-year panel where the dependent variable is either a dummy that captures whether at
least one of a certain type of social transfer program is in operation or a share of a certain type of program in the overall number of
transfer programs in a country in a particular year. We merge this data on social transfers with other databases on socioeconomic
indicators and political features of countries. As a result, we have a panel dataset that combines both major characteristics of social
transfer programs and other indicators by country and year from 1960 until 2015. All countries included in the sample are
considered as “low income,” “lower-middle income,” and “middle income” during a period of at least ten years since 1960 according
to the World Bank's classiﬁcation.
The data on social transfers are merged with the polity score from the Center for Systemic Peace's Polity IV database by Marshall
et al. (2016), and Boix et al. (2013) binary measure of democracy updated up until 2010. We focus on distinguishing between the two
democratic indices as the former is based on constitutional constraints whereas the latter represents an empirical measure of
democracy incorporating the elements of contestation and participation. In comparison with Polity IV, Boix et al.’s index has a
minimal suﬀrage requirement for democracy which is important in a historical perspective.3
The data on economic development and governance indicators – including GDP per capita, natural resource rents, total
population, the share of urban population, the share of women in the total population and in the labor force, age dependency ratio,
the share of agricultural value added, tax revenues as a share of GDP, government expenditure, and primary and secondary school
enrollment – are taken from the World Development Indicators (WDIs) dataset of the World Bank.
We control for the degree of revolutionary threat with a dummy that indicates if at least one protest event occurred in a country
in a particular year. The information on protests is extracted from the SPEED Project Civil Unrest Event Data of the Cline Center for
Democracy. Personal autonomy rights and political participation rights taken from Welzel (2013) are employed as alternative
measures of paternalism.
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for all variables separately for democracies and non-democracies. The distinction
between regimes is based on the polity score threshold of 6. We report means, standard deviations, and the total number of
3 Munck and Verkuilen (2002) review alternative methodologies of constructing democracy indices and conclude that many of them suﬀer from important
drawbacks. However, Polity IV and Boix et al.’s indices are considered as most representative ones in many studies.
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observations. The summary statistics show that we have more country-year observations for non-democracies than for democracies.
This share is explained by the fact that many countries were non-democratic in the 1960s and then experienced democratization in
the 1980s—for example, African and Latin American countries. Democracies tend to be more developed than non-democracies are,
with much lower infant mortality rates. Democracies have higher population numbers, with a greater share of an urban population
and a lower one of young people under 15—as well as higher school enrollment rates. Total natural resources and agricultural
income constitute a larger part of GDP in non-democracies than in democracies. The net oﬃcial development assistance and oﬃcial
aid received is also higher in non-democracies. The mean value of GDP per capita for all years is similar in both regimes, but its
standard deviation is signiﬁcantly higher for non-democracies. Tax revenues also are comparable across regimes, but the data is
quite limited and cannot be seen as a complete picture of tax redistribution in developing countries—especially in non-democracies,
where only one-quarter of all country-year statistics are available.
Fig. 1 displays the signiﬁcant expansion of social transfer programs across political regimes over time that was much more
pronounced in democracies. It also highlights that in democracies relatively more conditional programs were adopted than in non-
democracies. In 2014 about 70 percent of programs in democracies are conditional (66 unconditional programs versus 47
conditional programs), while in non-democracies only about 40 percent of the programs are conditional (34 versus 14).
Fig. 2 illustrates the detailed distribution of countries with an unconditional and a conditional program along the polity scale
taken from the Polity IV data by Marshall et al. (2016). We can conﬁrm that democracies adopt more transfer programs of any type
than non-democracies do, as for both types of transfer the distributions are skewed upward and the median polity scores are higher
Table 1
Summary statistics for democracies and non-democracies.
Non-Democracies Democracies
Mean Sd N Mean Sd N
GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$) 4281 10,132 3617 4059 3476 1753
Total population (in million) 30.7 122 4521 48 155 1805
Urban population (% of total) 40.10 23.27 4524 48.39 21.78 1797
Female population (% of total) 49.55 3.16 4524 50.31 1.04 1799
Age dependency ratio, young (% of working-age population) 73.69 20.30 4521 61.05 20.86 1799
Age dependency ratio, old (% of working-age population) 7.02 2.94 4521 9.25 4.87 1799
Mortality rate, infant (per 1000 live births) 78.69 48.54 4204 44.42 33.35 1777
Total natural resources rents (% of GDP) 15.19 16.38 3128 7.14 9.10 1555
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) 26.29 16.38 3090 17.39 12.62 1566
Protest events (SPEED) 0.44 0.50 4528 0.31 0.46 1805
GINI index of market income inequality (Solt, 2016) 40.65 8.79 1845 42.51 8.86 1105
Net oﬃcial development assistance and oﬃcial aid received (constant 2013 US$ million) 519 811 4140 542 855 1702
Tax revenue (% of GDP) 14.02 8.00 864 16.70 7.78 855
General government ﬁnal consumption expenditure (% of GDP) 15.23 7.49 3387 14.95 9.02 1615
Female labor force (% of total labor force) 38.35 12.28 1863 40.16 6.91 1799
School enrollment, primary (gross), gender parity index (GPI) 0.85 0.18 2800 0.96 0.11 1287
School enrollment, secondary (gross), gender parity index (GPI) 0.77 0.28 2082 0.97 0.21 1053
Personal autonomy rights (QoG and Welzel, 2013) 0.39 0.18 2160 0.64 0.18 1119
Political participation rights (QoG and Welzel, 2013) 0.31 0.21 2174 0.76 0.16 1121
Notes: The upper panel shows variables used in the main specification while variables in the lower panel are used for robustness checks. The sources of the data are
presented in the parentheses after the variable definition. If the source is not indicated, then the data is extracted from the World Development Indicators (WDIs)
dataset of the World Bank. The other sources of the data are the following: SPEED refers to the Civil Unrest Event Data of the Cline Center for Democracy; QoG
indicates the Quality of Government Institute database of the University of Gothenburg.
Fig. 1. Conditional and unconditional transfers in democracies and non-democracies, 1990–2014.
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than 5.4 Further, the median is higher for conditional than for unconditional transfer: it is 8 in the ﬁrst case, and 6 in the second.
Conditional transfer programs are thus more often adopted in more democratic countries. In addition, the box is much smaller for
conditional transfers. Hence, while conditional schemes are only prevalent in countries with a high polity score, unconditional
schemes are widespread across regimes with another peak in the distribution of such schemes in very authoritarian regimes.
5. Empirical evidence
In this section, the empirical results of the analysis on the link between regime type and the probability of adopting any social
transfer program or a particular type of program are presented. In addition, the eﬀects of inequality, tax redistribution, paternalism,
and other variables on the choice of transfer program types are studied.
5.1. Regime types and any social transfer
First, we report the estimates for adopting any transfer program. In Table 2 the dependent variable is a dummy that equals 1 if a
country has at least one unconditional or conditional redistributive transfer program in a particular year and 0 if it has none.
Columns 1–2 present the OLS results with the polity score from Marshall et al (2016) and the binary democratic index from Boix
et al. (2013) as main explanatory variables, respectively. Both regime type variables are positive and strongly signiﬁcant in the OLS
speciﬁcations. The coeﬃcient on the polity score is lower because it ranges from −10 (institutionalized autocracy) to 10
(institutionalized democracy), whereas the democracy variable is a dummy that equals 1 if a regime is democratic. These
preliminary results suggest that more democratic countries are more likely to adopt a transfer program of any type.
However, the estimates from OLS on the pooled data with country- and year-ﬁxed eﬀects suﬀer from endogeneity caused by
measurement error, or by time-varying omitted variables that might be external drivers for the simultaneous change in regime type
and the probability of having a transfer program. Columns 3–5 report results from the IV estimations. In Column 3, following
Persson and Tabellini (2009) the polity score is instrumented through neighbors’ democratic capital. In Columns 4–5, the polity
score and the binary democratic index are instrumented through democratization waves, respectively.
Tests for the goodness-of-ﬁt of the IV speciﬁcations reveal that the ﬁrst instrument of neighbors’ democratic capital is relevant
only for the polity variable and is not for the binary democratic index. This is very probably explained by smaller country coverage
and timespan for the democratic index as compared to the polity score. As we calculate the democratic capital of neighboring
countries without water borders, the sample size is sharply reduced and the instrument is thus not reliable for the binary democratic
index. Since the second instrument, democratization waves, is calculated on the basis of the democratic scores of all countries in the
region and not only neighboring ones, there are much fewer missing values and the instrument is relevant and valid for both the
polity score and the binary democratic index. We present F statistics of excluded instruments for the ﬁrst stage regressions for all
speciﬁcations.
The result using neighbors’ democratic capital as an instrument for democracy (Column 3) conﬁrms the conclusion of the OLS
speciﬁcations. A change in one score toward a higher level of democracy leads to an almost 3 percentage point increase in the
probability of having a transfer program. OLS is hence downward biased. Surprisingly, the 2SLS estimates using democratization
waves based on the polity score or binary democracy index (Columns 4 and 5) do not conﬁrm a signiﬁcant eﬀect of democracy on the
adoption of transfer programs. Hence, we ﬁnd cautious evidence that democracies have a higher probability of launching a transfer
program, although the result is not robust to the second IV identiﬁcation strategy.
The identifying assumption for the IV speciﬁcation is that the democratic capital and democratization waves aﬀect the
democratic score in a particular country but that once regime change is controlled for they have no independent eﬀect on the
-1
0
-5
0
5
10
P
ol
ity
 s
co
re
Unconditional Conditional
Fig. 2. Transfer program types according to polity score, 1990–2014.
4 Countries with a polity score above 6 are classiﬁed as democratic.
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adoption of a transfer program. The instruments account for up to 48 percent of the variation in regime change depending on the
speciﬁcation.5
In all speciﬁcations, we control for the number of social transfer programs in the region, to exclude the possibility that
democratic capital or democratization waves also capture the expansion of social transfer policies within a region. This social policy
diﬀusion eﬀect is strongly signiﬁcant, and equals about 1–1.5 percentage points. At the same time, it is clear that the correlation
between regime type and the likelihood of introducing a transfer program is not crowded out by a policy diﬀusion eﬀect.
The other control variables demonstrate the expected signs. The coeﬃcient on the lagged GDP per capita is positive, while the
coeﬃcient on the lagged squared term of GDP per capita is negative. They are both highly signiﬁcant. This supports the nonlinear
eﬀect of economic development on adopting a transfer program. Richer countries apply more transfer programs in general.
The infant mortality rate is negatively correlated with the probability of having a transfer program. This correlation may be
explained by reverse causality or omitted variable bias. Infant mortality may be falling in countries where social transfers, more so
conditional ones, are in place. Further, we may not suﬃciently capture weak state capacity, which may explain both the lack of
transfer adoption and high infant mortality because of deﬁcient health service delivery. Likewise, the positive correlation of high
infant mortality with the lack of social transfers may also be rationalized by taking high infant mortality as a general sign of
neglecting social services for the poor.
Demographics seems important as well. Total population is not signiﬁcant but the share of urban population demonstrates a
Table 2
Political regimes and all transfer programs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
any transfer any transfer any transfer any transfer any transfer
OLS OLS IV capital IV waves IV waves
polity score 0.008*** 0.027* −0.009
(0.001) (0.014) (0.005)
democratic index 0.162*** −0.215
(0.016) (0.231)
infant mortality −0.076*** −0.133*** −0.057* −0.277*** −0.290***
(0.026) (0.028) (0.032) (0.036) (0.039)
female population 0.857*** 1.514*** 1.334*** 3.492*** 4.071***
(0.268) (0.339) (0.381) (0.712) (0.637)
protest −0.031*** −0.027** −0.019 −0.012 −0.029*
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.017)
GDP 1.137*** 1.058*** 1.100*** 0.875*** 0.862***
(0.113) (0.132) (0.150) (0.163) (0.193)
GDP squared −0.061*** −0.056*** −0.054*** −0.043*** −0.042***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013)
total population −0.001 0.106 0.065 0.069 −0.019
(0.059) (0.066) (0.115) (0.096) (0.199)
urban population −0.179*** −0.095** −0.197*** −0.153** −0.148**
(0.037) (0.041) (0.041) (0.061) (0.063)
agedepend old 0.147*** 0.128** 0.153*** 0.178** 0.111
(0.055) (0.056) (0.058) (0.076) (0.116)
agedepend young −0.073 −0.098* −0.241** 0.031 0.045
(0.049) (0.054) (0.099) (0.067) (0.107)
natural resources −0.034*** −0.027*** −0.031*** −0.033*** −0.032**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013)
agricultural value −0.113*** −0.082*** −0.097*** −0.101*** −0.106***
(0.020) (0.021) (0.024) (0.026) (0.033)
regional diﬀusion 0.011*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.015***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Constant −6.999*** −10.627*** −9.594*** −16.627*** −17.362***
(1.596) (1.852) (2.858) (3.434) (4.269)
Observations 3,924 3,779 3,268 2,516 2,304
R-squared 0.727 0.735 0.706 0.710 0.677
F ﬁrst 21.05 224.57 14.76
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. All estimations are made for the whole sample, where the unit of analysis is
country–year. The time period is 1960–2014. The dependent variables are dummies for any transfer program. The methods employed are OLS (Columns 1–2), IV
based on democratic capital (Column 3), IV based on democratization waves (Columns 4–5). All specifications include a full set of country- and year-fixed effects. The
main explanatory variables are one period lagged democratic scores from Polity IV by Marshall et al. (2016) and Boix et al. (2013). Other control variables listed in
order of appearance (all in one-year lags and continuous ones in logs) include infant mortality rate, share of female population, dummy for protest events, GDP per
capita, GDP per capita squared, total population, share of urban population, age dependency ratio of the old and young, natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP,
agricultural value as a percentage of GDP, the total number of transfer programs in a particular year in the region.
5 The ﬁrst-stage regressions are available upon request.
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signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect on the probability of having a transfer program. A larger share of old people to working age people leads
to more transfer programs being in operation although this result is not robust across all IV speciﬁcations. The lagged share of
women in the total population is highly signiﬁcant and positive in all speciﬁcations. Resource-rich countries are about 3 percentage
points less likely to adopt a transfer program. The ruling elite in countries with resource abundance may have more opportunities for
repression and other ways of pleasing the population than by adopting social transfers. The revolutionary threat measured by a
dummy on at least one protest event in the previous year is signiﬁcant and negative in Columns 1, 2, and 5. In Column 3 it is
signiﬁcant only at the 20 percent level.
5.2. Regime types and unconditional social transfers
This section presents insights on the eﬀect of regime type on an unconditional social transfer program in place. We run two
speciﬁcations: ﬁrst, the dependent variable is a dummy that equals 1 if a country has at least one unconditional transfer program in a
particular year and 0 if it has none (see Table 3). Then, Table 4 reports the results from regressions where the dependent variable is
the share of unconditional programs in the total number of programs based on a sub-sample of countries excluding those without a
program of any type. This second speciﬁcation thus captures the eﬀects of democracy (and other explanatory variables) on the
adoption of unconditional programs given any social transfer policy in place.
The OLS estimates of the eﬀect of democracy on the probability of having an unconditional transfer program as well as on the
share of unconditional programs are positive and signiﬁcant (Columns 1–2 in Tables 3 and 4). However, the point estimates become
negative and strongly signiﬁcant in the 2SLS speciﬁcations (Columns 3–5 in Tables 3 and 4). The upward bias in the OLS
Table 3
Political regimes and unconditional transfer programs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
unconditional transfer unconditional transfer unconditional transfer unconditional transfer unconditional transfer
OLS OLS IV capital IV waves IV waves
polity score 0.006*** −0.034** −0.022***
(0.001) (0.017) (0.006)
democratic index 0.115*** −0.616**
(0.015) (0.253)
infant mortality −0.073*** −0.120*** −0.117*** −0.353*** −0.277***
(0.027) (0.029) (0.039) (0.038) (0.050)
female population 0.049 0.709** −0.838* 2.471*** 2.301***
(0.280) (0.325) (0.441) (0.647) (0.700)
protest −0.024** −0.017* −0.031** −0.026** −0.039**
(0.011) (0.010) (0.014) (0.013) (0.019)
GDP 1.179*** 1.000*** 1.343*** 0.610*** 0.639***
(0.116) (0.132) (0.162) (0.162) (0.207)
GDP squared −0.063*** −0.051*** −0.078*** −0.028** −0.034**
(0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014)
total population −0.169*** −0.147** −0.567*** −0.179* −0.769***
(0.064) (0.067) (0.126) (0.101) (0.225)
urban population −0.156*** −0.084** −0.138*** −0.013 −0.037
(0.039) (0.042) (0.043) (0.063) (0.076)
agedepend old 0.008 −0.063 −0.035 0.116 −0.148
(0.055) (0.055) (0.066) (0.079) (0.131)
agedepend young 0.042 0.014 0.178* 0.266*** 0.395***
(0.051) (0.053) (0.099) (0.069) (0.123)
natural resources −0.027*** −0.020** −0.016 −0.004 −0.012
(0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014)
agricultural value −0.050** −0.031 −0.042 −0.014 −0.042
(0.020) (0.020) (0.026) (0.026) (0.036)
regional diﬀusion 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.016*** 0.007** −0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Observations 3,924 3,779 3,268 2,516 2,304
R-squared 0.719 0.739 0.617 0.677 0.510
F ﬁrst 16.48 204.47 17.19
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. All estimations are made for the whole sample, where the unit of analysis is
country–year. The time period is 1960–2014. The dependent variable is a dummy for at least one unconditional transfer program in a country in a particular year.
The methods employed are OLS (Columns 1–2), IV based on democratic capital (Column 3), IV based on democratization waves (Columns 4–5). All specifications
include a full set of country- and year-fixed effects. The main explanatory variables are one period lagged democratic scores from Polity IV by Marshall et al. (2016)
and Boix et al. (2013). Other control variables listed in order of appearance (all in one-year lags and continuous ones in logs) include infant mortality rate, share of
female population, dummy for protest events, GDP per capita, GDP per capita squared, total population, share of urban population, age dependency ratio of the old
and young, natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP, agricultural value as a percentage of GDP, the total number of transfer programs in a particular year in the
region.
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estimations is likely to be due to omitted variables, for example state capacity. Similar to the argument made above for child
mortality, state capacity is likely to be correlated with the polity score and will, at the same time, aﬀect the ability and thus likelihood
of adopting a transfer program. The 2SLS estimations conﬁrm that non-democratic countries tend to choose unconditional transfer
programs. This eﬀect persists for both the dummy and share of unconditional programs, as well as for both measures of democracy
and for both IV strategies (Tables 3 and 4).
A one point increase on the polity scale results in a 2–3 percentage point reduction of the probability of having an unconditional
transfer and of the share of unconditional transfers. Hence, the eﬀect is quite large: a regime change from democracy to non-
democracy may result in a 40–60 percentage point increase of the probability of an unconditional transfer scheme being introduced
(Columns 3–5 in Table 3). The share of unconditional transfers after a regime change may increase by 70–98 percentage points if we
reduce our sample to countries with at least one transfer program regardless its type (Columns 3–5 in Table 4).
In all speciﬁcations, we again control for the number of unconditional social transfer programs in the region in the previous
period. An additional unconditional program in the region increases the likelihood of adopting the same type of program in a
particular country by 1.5–2 percentage points. The other control variables have eﬀects that are similar to those in the above
speciﬁcations with any transfer program. Interestingly, natural resource abundance and agricultural value added are not signiﬁcant
for unconditional transfers. Whereas the occurrence of at least one protest event becomes strongly signiﬁcant: periods without any
protest are likely characterized by at least one unconditional social transfer program in place. This suggests that unconditional
transfers may be used to prevent civil unrest as this type of transfer provides urgent assistance.
Table 4
Political regimes and shares of unconditional transfer programs.
(1) (2) (3) (5) (6)
unconditional transfer
share
unconditional transfer
share
unconditional transfer
share
unconditional transfer
share
unconditional transfer
share
OLS OLS IV capital IV waves IV waves
polity score 0.004*** −0.069** −0.024***
(0.001) (0.028) (0.005)
democratic index 0.085*** −0.985***
(0.016) (0.320)
infant mortality −0.090*** −0.149*** −0.265*** −0.485*** −0.426***
(0.033) (0.036) (0.088) (0.041) (0.076)
female population −0.235 −0.050 −2.977*** 2.842** 0.214
(0.385) (0.383) (1.135) (1.210) (2.375)
protest 0.001 −0.003 −0.041* −0.014 −0.068**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.025) (0.016) (0.031)
GDP 1.059*** 0.948*** 1.475*** 0.604*** 0.757**
(0.137) (0.155) (0.256) (0.185) (0.297)
GDP squared −0.057*** −0.047*** −0.091*** −0.029** −0.051**
(0.010) (0.011) (0.019) (0.013) (0.020)
total population −0.058 −0.098 −0.605*** 0.170* −0.700**
(0.066) (0.074) (0.192) (0.097) (0.304)
urban population −0.087** −0.038 −0.059 0.232*** 0.274**
(0.042) (0.048) (0.062) (0.072) (0.134)
agedepend old −0.323*** −0.332*** −0.471*** −0.093 −0.289*
(0.059) (0.062) (0.090) (0.078) (0.157)
agedepend young −0.206*** −0.121* 0.087 −0.056 0.262
(0.058) (0.064) (0.183) (0.075) (0.182)
natural resources −0.040*** −0.035*** −0.019 −0.014 −0.025
(0.009) (0.010) (0.015) (0.011) (0.019)
agricultural value −0.056** −0.025 0.022 −0.034 −0.063
(0.024) (0.025) (0.039) (0.032) (0.054)
regional diﬀusion 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.026*** 0.016*** 0.008
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
Observations 3,133 2,903 2,529 2,004 1,826
R-squared 0.703 0.721 0.331 0.668 0.170
F ﬁrst 9.38 187.51 13.81
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. All estimations are made for the sample of countries with at least one transfer
program in operation. The unit of analysis is country–year. The time period is 1960–2014. The dependent variable is a share of unconditional transfer programs in a
country in particular year. The methods employed are OLS (Columns 1–2), IV based on democratic capital (Column 3), IV based on democratization waves (Columns
4–5). All specifications include a full set of country- and year-fixed effects. The main explanatory variables are one period lagged democratic scores from Polity IV by
Marshall et al. (2016) and Boix et al. (2013). Other control variables listed in order of appearance (all in one-year lags and continuous ones in logs) include infant
mortality rate, share of female population, dummy for protest events, GDP per capita, GDP per capita squared, total population, share of urban population, age
dependency ratio of the old and young, natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP, agricultural value as a percentage of GDP, the total number of transfer
programs in a particular year in the region.
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5.3. Regime types and conditional social transfers
In this section, we discuss the link between regime types and conditional transfers. The speciﬁcations are similar to the above
subsection. In the speciﬁcations of Table 5 the dependent variable is a dummy that equals 1 if a country has at least one conditional
transfer program in operation in a particular year, and 0 if none. In Table 6, we report the results for the share of conditional
schemes in the total number of programs in a country in a particular year. Again, we limit the sample to countries with at least one
program of any type in operation.
The coeﬃcients on the democracy variables are positive and signiﬁcant in the OLS speciﬁcations (Columns 1–2 in Tables 5 and
6). Implementing the IV strategies supports this ﬁnding when the dependent variable is the conditional transfer dummy and we
instrument the binary democratic index with democratization waves (Column 5 in Table 5) but not in the IV speciﬁcations with the
polity score as main explanatory variable (Columns 3–4 of Table 5). However, when the dependent variable is the share of
conditional transfers, the IV speciﬁcations show a signiﬁcantly positive and robust eﬀect of democracy (Columns 3–5 in Table 6).
Once social transfer policies are put in place, being a democratic regime increases the number of pro-poor conditional programs.
Democracies thus enhance the relative importance of conditional cash transfers that imply investments in education and health.
The results in Tables 5 and 6 demonstrate a downward bias in the OLS speciﬁcations. This bias may stem from omitted variables,
which may again be related to weak state capacity that explains both levels of democracy and speciﬁc program adoption. In addition,
omitted human capital endowment may play a role: societies with high human capital endowment are more likely to be democratic
but tend to adopt fewer conditional programs as investment in human capital accumulation is not their priority.
As above, the estimated eﬀects are large: a transition from non-democracy to democracy increases the share of conditional
Table 5
Political regimes and conditional transfer programs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
conditional transfer conditional transfer conditional transfer conditional transfer conditional transfer
OLS OLS IV capital IV waves IV waves
polity score 0.004*** −0.004 −0.000
(0.001) (0.010) (0.004)
democratic index 0.072*** 0.398*
(0.013) (0.232)
infant mortality −0.131*** −0.129*** −0.198*** −0.066** −0.077**
(0.018) (0.019) (0.023) (0.028) (0.034)
female population 0.693*** 0.835*** 0.660** 0.725* 1.300**
(0.204) (0.219) (0.318) (0.436) (0.535)
protest −0.025*** −0.021*** −0.021** −0.016 −0.000
(0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.014)
GDP 0.362*** 0.365*** 0.315*** 0.394*** 0.283*
(0.089) (0.094) (0.112) (0.123) (0.166)
GDP squared −0.023*** −0.024*** −0.019** −0.022*** −0.009
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
total population 0.205*** 0.271*** 0.074 −0.064 0.433**
(0.052) (0.056) (0.099) (0.087) (0.203)
urban population −0.003 0.057** −0.045* −0.135*** −0.120**
(0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.049) (0.057)
agedepend old 0.297*** 0.318*** 0.375*** 0.086* 0.261**
(0.036) (0.038) (0.041) (0.045) (0.103)
agedepend young 0.121*** 0.086** 0.236*** 0.262*** 0.075
(0.035) (0.035) (0.075) (0.049) (0.101)
natural resources −0.001 0.005 −0.012* −0.018** −0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010)
agricultural value −0.038*** −0.019 −0.070*** −0.048** −0.003
(0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.022) (0.026)
regional diﬀusion 0.029*** 0.032*** 0.025*** 0.030*** 0.034***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Observations 3,924 3,779 3,268 2,516 2,304
R-squared 0.650 0.613 0.646 0.649 0.516
F ﬁrst 19.27 212.63 15.80
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. All estimations are made for the whole sample, where the unit of analysis is
country–year. The time period is 1960–2014. The dependent variable is a dummy for at least one conditional transfer program in a country in a particular year. The
methods employed are OLS (Columns 1–2), IV based on democratic capital (Column 3), IV based on democratization waves (Columns 4–5). All specifications include
a full set of country- and year-fixed effects. The main explanatory variables are one period lagged democratic scores from Polity IV by Marshall et al. (2016) and Boix
et al. (2013). Other control variables listed in order of appearance (all in one-year lags and continuous ones in logs) include infant mortality rate, share of female
population, dummy for protest events, GDP per capita, GDP per capita squared, total population, share of urban population, age dependency ratio of the old and
young, natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP, agricultural value as a percentage of GDP, the total number of transfer programs in a particular year in the
region.
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transfer programs by 20–40 percentage points according to the estimations based on the polity score (Columns 3–4 in Table 6), and
by about 50 percentage points according to the estimations based on the binary index (Column 5 in Table 6). The magnitude of the
eﬀect is lower for the polity variable than for the binary democratic index, but nevertheless large.
We do not discuss the eﬀects of control variables in detail as they tend to be similar as in the case of any transfer. One can only
notice that total population demonstrates a robust positive association with the conditional transfer dummy. Further, a higher
female share results in more conditional transfers. This might be related to women's empowerment ensured often through
conditional social transfer programs. Countries with high natural resources rents and agricultural value added tend to have less
conditional programs. Regional diﬀusion also matters for conditional transfers. The eﬀect is larger than for unconditional transfers
and varies between 2.5 and 3 percentage points.
5.4. Additional results and robustness checks
This section presents results on the eﬀect of inequality on the adoption of a transfer program type as well as several sensitivity
checks to the main ﬁndings. The robustness tests consist of speciﬁcation changes, the inclusion of additional control variables,
running regressions for diﬀerent timespans, and controlling for lags of one, three, or ﬁve years. We also check the ﬁndings using
alternative data on social transfer programs.
The eﬀect of inequality is considered separately in sub-samples of democratic and non-democratic countries, as it can be
assumed that political regimes have structural diﬀerences in social policymaking while ﬁghting inequality. We use gross income
Table 6
Political regimes and shares of conditional transfer programs.
(1) (2) (3) (5) (6)
conditional transfer
share
conditional transfer
share
conditional transfer
share
conditional transfer
share
conditional transfer share
OLS OLS IV capital IV waves IV waves
polity score 0.002** 0.021* 0.014***
(0.001) (0.013) (0.004)
democratic index 0.042*** 0.734***
(0.012) (0.253)
infant mortality −0.046** −0.047* −0.058 0.120*** 0.030
(0.022) (0.024) (0.042) (0.031) (0.057)
female population 1.162*** 0.937*** 2.051*** 3.100*** 5.180***
(0.211) (0.232) (0.559) (0.795) (1.603)
protest −0.010 −0.011 0.006 0.009 0.036
(0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.011) (0.023)
GDP 0.186** 0.212** 0.071 0.589*** 0.441**
(0.082) (0.088) (0.124) (0.126) (0.220)
GDP squared −0.013** −0.014** −0.003 −0.033*** −0.016
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.014)
total population 0.239*** 0.267*** 0.349*** 0.165** 0.853***
(0.049) (0.058) (0.105) (0.081) (0.237)
urban population 0.004 0.044* −0.017 −0.168*** −0.148*
(0.023) (0.024) (0.027) (0.042) (0.092)
agedepend old 0.147*** 0.204*** 0.220*** −0.031 0.240**
(0.033) (0.037) (0.043) (0.046) (0.112)
agedepend young −0.028 −0.035 −0.135 0.001 −0.246*
(0.035) (0.036) (0.098) (0.048) (0.128)
natural resources −0.013** −0.010* −0.023*** −0.028*** −0.010
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.013)
agricultural value −0.032** −0.012 −0.057*** −0.051* −0.022
(0.016) (0.016) (0.020) (0.026) (0.036)
regional diﬀusion 0.021*** 0.024*** 0.019*** 0.024*** 0.026***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Observations 3,133 2,903 2,529 2,004 1,826
R-squared 0.602 0.570 0.516 0.602 0.005
F ﬁrst 11.52 182.39 13.58
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. All estimations are made for the sample of countries with at least one transfer
program in operation. The unit of analysis is country–year. The time period is 1960–2014. The dependent variable is a share of conditional transfer programs in a
country in particular year. The methods employed are OLS (Columns 1–2), IV based on democratic capital (Column 3), IV based on democratization waves (Columns
4–5). All specifications include a full set of country- and year-fixed effects. The main explanatory variables are one period lagged democratic scores from Polity IV by
Marshall et al. (2016) and Boix et al. (2013). Other control variables listed in order of appearance (all in one-year lags and continuous ones in logs) include infant
mortality rate, share of female population, dummy for protest events, GDP per capita, GDP per capita squared, total population, share of urban population, age
dependency ratio of the old and young, natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP, agricultural value as a percentage of GDP, the total number of transfer
programs in a particular year in the region.
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inequality from the standardized database by Solt (2016).6 The models where the dependent variable is a dummy that at least one
program of a certain type is in operation do not show any signiﬁcant results for inequality.7 However, the share of conditional
transfers signiﬁcantly decreases with higher inequality in democracies. The eﬀect is not large but consistent with the logic that higher
inequality may increase civil unrest and that unconditional transfers may be adopted to prevent civil unrest.
As robustness checks, we include additional control variables in our benchmark speciﬁcations; in particular, the level of
paternalism, taxes and government expenditure, development assistance, the share of women in the labor force, and school
enrollment rates. Inclusion of these variables reduces the sample by more than half, even if the time period is limited to 1990 to
2015. However, these results should still be a part of the analysis, as social transfer policies may be aﬀected by these control
variables.
We explore how the level of paternalism in a society inﬂuences the choice of social transfer programs. This is particularly
interesting for conditional transfers as conditions may be adopted to facilitate targeting of the “deserving poor”, which would be
more likely in societies with higher levels of paternalism. We use two alternative measures of paternalism: personal autonomy rights
and political participation rights from Welzel (2013). The indicators measure to what extent a country enacts personal autonomy or
political participation rights by law, and respects them in practice. Both variables have a positive eﬀect on the adoption of conditional
schemes. Hence, lower – not higher – paternalism is associated with more conditional transfer programs. For unconditional
transfers, the eﬀect of paternalism is rather the opposite. While countries with higher personal autonomy rights are less likely to
have an unconditional transfer, political participation rights have no signiﬁcant eﬀect. In the analysis of any type of social transfer,
political participation rights are positive and strongly signiﬁcant implying that social policies are more widely used in countries
where citizens’ political support matters.
The literature has already pointed out that political regime type might aﬀect levels of taxation and government spending (Hettich
and Winer, 1999; Kenny and Winer, 2006; Profeta et al., 2013; Acemoglu et al., 2014b). Therefore, we change the speciﬁcations to
control for change in government tax redistribution policy and expenditure across diﬀerent regime types. Taxation and public
spending are not that signiﬁcant in any of the regressions, meaning that government strategies on tax redistribution are not strongly
correlated with the choice in favor of any type of social transfer program. This might be explained by the fact that we consider non-
contributory social transfer schemes that are not part of contributory social security systems based on tax redistribution. Moreover,
our main results remain unchanged. We conﬁrm that in developing countries government tax redistribution does not crowd out the
impact of political regime type on the choice of social transfer programs.
The lagged oﬃcial development assistance and aid as a share of GDP prove not signiﬁcant. It appears that foreign aid does not
inﬂuence the adoption of social transfer programs.
The share of women in the labor force is signiﬁcant and negative; fewer women in the labor force are associated with adopting
more social transfer programs of any type. If fewer working women are a sign of a poorer society, this may explain a higher demand
for poverty alleviation policies. Moreover, fewer women in the labor force may lead to more women's empowerment policies through
social assistance. Indeed, many social transfer programs have women as their main target group.
Initial levels of educational achievement matter for social transfer policies, and especially for the choice of conditional transfer
programs. Enrollment in primary education is signiﬁcantly positive, whereas that in secondary education is signiﬁcantly negative.
Countries with already high levels of secondary education may not see the need to incentivize household investments in education.
Further, we examine whether political regime type aﬀects the choice of social transfers with conditions in a particular sphere:
education or health. We create separate dummies on the types of condition, such as regular medical investigations or school
attendance, and run the same regressions as in Tables 2–6. We can conﬁrm that the type of condition does not matter for the results
in this paper. However, for health conditions results are somewhat less signiﬁcant and it seems as if regime type is of greater
importance for schemes with education conditions.
The main speciﬁcations above use annual panel data. To minimize serial correlation a ﬁve-year panel from 1960 onwards that
takes an observation every ﬁve years is constructed. According to Acemoglu et al. (2014b), this approach is more appropriate than
taking averages over a ﬁve-year period since the latter could keep serial correlation and render estimates inconsistent. In addition,
we run speciﬁcations using diﬀerent lag structures, with lags higher than one year—three and ﬁve years—on the annual panel. All
results remain unchanged, except for the case of the share of unconditional transfers—where the democratic score becomes
insigniﬁcant. All other control variables are slightly less signiﬁcant, but do not change the signs of the eﬀects. Furthermore, in view of
the binary nature of the dependent variable, we also run the logit and probit models with and without control variables. The results
concerning the link between democracy and the probability of having a transfer program remain robust. As the count models have
limitations in using ﬁxed eﬀects, we use OLS regressions as baseline models.
In this paper, we use a new dataset on social transfer policies that was constructed for this research purpose. We check the
validity of the results by applying the same analysis to the only available alternative data at the cross-country level—that of
Barrientos et al. (2010). The results hold true when using this earlier data.
6 The data is multiply imputed but has a high country–year coverage. We also extract the inequality data from the World Income Inequality Database (WIID3.3) by
UNU-WIDER (2015) but the results based on that data for a ﬁve-year sample are not robust.
7 The results discussed in this section are available from the authors upon request.
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6. Conclusion
Do political institutions and motives have an impact on the choice of social policies? This question is a critical one, especially for
developing countries—where poverty alleviation and social security issues are at the forefront of the political agenda. Developing
countries also suﬀer from poor governance and weak state capacity, which create biases in the formulation and implementation of
social policies. In this paper, we investigate how politics inﬂuences the types of non-contributory social transfer programs that have
been broadly applied in the developing world.
Using the new and unique NSTP dataset collected by Dodlova et al. (2017), we contrast unconditional pro-poor transfers directly
paid to the poor with conditional transfers, which are available to the beneﬁciaries under special stipulations such as school
attendance and/or health check-ups. Our empirical analysis thus assesses the eﬀects of the regime type on the probability to adopt
(1) any type of social transfers, (2) unconditional and/or (3) conditional transfer programs. We apply two IV strategies to test the
causal eﬀects of democracy on the choice of transfer types. We also run regressions using shares of unconditional (and conditional)
programs in all transfer programs based on a sub-sample of social transfer policy adopters.
We ﬁnd, ﬁrst, ambiguous evidence on the relationship between the regime type and the probability of having a transfer program
of any type. This ambiguity may mainly be explained by the fact that social transfer programs are being implemented out of diﬀerent
motives that are likely to systematically diﬀer between regime types. Further, there may be non-linearities that our approach may not
be able to detect. For example, very repressive authoritarian regimes may not see the “need” to use social transfer programs to
appease their citizens.
Second, our analysis shows a robust eﬀect of being a non-democracy on adopting unconditional transfers. It can be assumed that
non-democracies introduce more unconditional transfer programs because they provide quicker short-term eﬀects that help to
maintain power and prevent civil unrest. Unconditional transfers can more easily be used and manipulated to target the insurgent
poor or buy-oﬀ potential opposition groups. Third, our analysis suggests that democracies are more likely to promote conditional
transfers. In particular, democracies enhance the relative importance of conditional cash transfers once countries have adopted some
transfer policy. Hence, of those countries that have a social transfer program, democracies seem to invest more in human capital and
thus long-term self-sustained development. At the same time, this may indicate that the eﬀect of democracy is conditional on the
capacity of the state to deliver such programs.
State capacity is likely to play an important role in explaining and conditioning the politics of social transfers. As there are
multiple channels through which state capacity aﬀects the regime type and vice versa, it may be hard to empirically pin down this
role in the analysis – also given the fact that state capacity is not straightforward to operationalize empirically. We attempt to deal
with this omitted variable problem by controlling for the imperfect proxies of tax revenues and other types of redistribution –
without major implications for our ﬁndings.
The role of state capacity is only one aspect that – in our view – merits further research in the study of the politics of social
policies. The motivations of democracies to choose more conditional transfers and of non-democracies to potentially use social
transfers to suppress social unrest are interesting further areas of inquiry. Work using within-country variation is promising to shed
light on the channels through which the political motives guide social policymaking, and which elements of the political structure are
most important for eﬀective and eﬃcient poverty alleviation policies.
The interesting ﬁnding by Benhassine et al. (2015) that a cash transfer labelled as an education program yields a large
improvement in school enrolment may generate a discussion that the distinction between conditional and unconditional transfers
might be fuzzy and not that important from the policy perspective. However, other studies show that explicit and enforced conditions
do indeed matter (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009). In particular, De Brauw and Hoddinott (2011) demonstrate that non-enforcement of
a condition signiﬁcantly reduces the likelihood that children attend school with this eﬀect most pronounced when children are
transitioning to lower secondary school.8 Whether strict conditions should be applied or whether nudging or labeling do the trick
may be context speciﬁc. Also, this question is crucial in view of the fact that enforcing conditions may be expensive.
The fact that there are systematic diﬀerences between regime types regarding the likelihood of adopting social transfer programs
and in the use of conditions highlights the importance of political motives in the formulation and implementation of social policies. It
is therefore crucial to have an understanding of the eﬀects of political systems and potential biases when designing and supporting
social policies in developing country contexts. This paper enhances our knowledge of political distortions in social policy, even
though it is hard to identify the exact political motivations behind choosing certain types of social policy in a cross-country analysis.
Our ﬁndings demonstrate that social policy might be designed based on the motives not related to pro-poor ones and these motives
are likely to compromise the eﬀectiveness of transfer schemes as instruments for poverty reduction.
Our evidence should be added to the list of arguments against considering such programs as a panacea to poverty reduction.
While introducing new pro-poor policy the policymakers should try to anticipate and oﬀset distortive political eﬀects by using the
elements of the policy design such as program type, selection basis, targeting mechanism and others. All political constraints for
social policy should be taken into account. For example, the international donors and funds might provide more support in favor of
conditional cash transfers implying investments in education and health or limit the fungibility of aid to reduce rent-seeking.
8 This refers to the absence of the forms needed to monitor school attendance in the case of Mexico's ﬂagship program PROGRESA.
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Colombia Maldives Tanzania
Congo Mali Thailand
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